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LENDING IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA THE }»OSSIBILITYOF THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK 
LENDING IN BOSNIA  .. HERZEGOVINA 
1.  Introducti~n  · 
In  the  light  of recent  developments  in  Bosnia-I:Ierzegovina  (BiH),  ECOFIN 
requested the Cprruitission on f:ebruary  16 to examine, in collaboration with the · 
European Investment Bank (EIB), the possibility of the Bank providing loans in_ 
this country.  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
Besides  humanitarian  aid,  BiH  together  with  other ·ex-Yugoslav  republics, 
receives reconstruction aid under the Council Regulation No ·1628/96 of 25  July 
1996  and  urider  the  PHARE  Regulation,  In  view .  of the .  urgent  needs  for 
reconstruction in BiH however, the Commission is in favour-of inviting the EIB 
·.to· extend its lending activities to BiH;  ~bile taking into account the particularities ... 
of the  politica:I ·economic  and  financial  environment  of tlie  country.·  . The 
possibility of  mobilising Bank loans in this country must be seen as a special and 
exceptional action whose main objective would be  to  contribute  to  the speedy 
reconstruction of  the country and, in the process, to facilitate the coinmwiicatioh · 
and the i~tegratiori of  the different communities living in the area. 
Th'e  EIB  has  expressed jts willingness  in  principle  to  start  oper~tions in BiH · 
provided. then~  is_ a  formal  Council Decision  granting a Community  Budget 
guarantee for these operations and 'subject to a positive decision of its Board of 
Governors.  The EIB  indicated having undertaken preparatory work to identify 
the . areas  of  possible . Bank  intervention  within ' the.  framework · of  the 
Reconstruction Programme agreed by the Intematio11:al CommunitY at successive 
Donors~ Pledging Conferences  sponsored  by  the  CommissiO'n  and  the  World 
Bank~ 
2.  .  Political, economic and financial background 
2.1.  Political backgrmmd 
According to the Dayton/Paris peace agreement signed on December 14,  1995,. 
BiH was to remain a single state being composed of two Entities, the Fed-eration 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (RS).  The imptemeiitation of 
DaYton  involves  militarY· and  civilian  aspects  contributing  in ·parallel  to 
regenerate confidence and stability; which are mpnitored annually by the Peace 
Implementation  Col.mcil  (PIC).  · The  military  a.Spects  ·have  been  deait 
successfully.  However, a military presence will remain necesSary for sometime. 
Civilian implementation has  been  much slower.  It  is  coordinated· by  the  High 
Representative whose mandate was reinforced at the last PIC conference in Bonn. 
on December 9-10,  1997.  · The appointment of a pro-Dayton government in the 
RS  has . paved  the  way  for  an  improved  cooperation  by  this  entity  with· the  .. 
. international  corinnunity,  making. the  political  and  economic  outlook' more 
favourable for the country as a whole.  .  .  . 
2 In  the  absence of a  Protocol  on  Financial _Cooperation  between BiH and  the 
Community,  which  usually  provides  With  the  framework  (objectives  and 
-- conditions) of  the EU financial cooperation with third countries, the involvement 
of the  EIB  iri  BiH  should  be  consistent with  the  policy  of the  Union  in this 
country  and  supportive  of the  objectives- of the  Dayton/Paris  agreement  and 
subsequent obligations. 
2.2.  Economic developments 
By 1995, GOP in BiH had shrunk to less than a third of  its pre-war level and per. 
capita GOP _had  fallen to US$500.  The  population was· 23% smaller than in 
1991, over 50 % of  the. popUlation had been displaced, and more than 1.2 million 
inhabitants were forced to flee abroad, mainly to the EU.  Physical capital and 
infrastructure  had  been  devastated.  With  the  end  of the  war,  the  economy 
· recovered strongly; fuelled by external assistance, mainly in the Federation. Real 
-.GOP growth reached 50% in 1996 for the -country as a whole, but decelerated to 
about 30% in 1997 owing to a slower pace of  financial assistance. In particular, 
the  RS  has suffered  self-imposed isolation from  the inteination.ally..,sponsored-
Reconstruction  programme  and  has  benefited  only  from  humanitarian  aid: 
Unemployment is reported ihJ,gh in both the Federation and RS (up to 50%) arid 
, represents a serious -threat to social stability and peace.  Considering the deficit 
of  the ttade balance (estimated at about US$ 2 billion in 1997 by the IMF with 
-imports  as  high  as  US$  2. 7  billion),  the  recovery  of economic  activity  and 
employment will continue-to heavily rely on the availability_ of official financial 
flows.  · 
· In,  1995, the international community endorsed- a medium-term programme for 
reconstruction and peace implementation activities in BiH amounting to US$ 5.1  --. 
·billion  for  the  period  1996-:-99  which included the  following  areas  among  i~ -
priorities:  basic infrastructure,  housing,  energy,  teleco:nununications,  transport, 
and  water  and  waste  management.  Following  three  Donors' . Pledging. 
conferences, US$ 1.6 billion of  aid had been donated to BiH by the end of  1997.1, 
of which  45%  originated  from  the. Community  and  the· Member  States.  In 
January 1998, the Council welcomed the formation ofthe new government in the 
RS  and· decided .to  immediately  support  it  in·  the  form  an  initial  emergency 
budgetary  grant in  the :amount  of up  to  ECU  6  million  and  to  examine  the 
possibilities for -further assistance.  Moreover, in view of weak implementation 
capacities -in  both  Entities,  the  Council  is  presently  discussing  a Commission 
proposal aiming at streamlining the :finaricial regulation _governing  its financial._ 
assistance to BiH. - ·  ·  -·  .' 
2.3:·  External.finanCial situation and ,prospects 
'  -· 
The_  external  debt  of BiH  was  eStimated  at  US$4.6 -billion  at  -end-1996, 
equivalent to over 160% of GOP.  -Against an accumulation of external arrears 
of some  US$  2 :billion,  the  authorities have tried to normalise  relations  with 
external_ creditors:  Arrears to the  lMF and  the  World  Bank were  cleared  in 
I  See Bosnia ~d  Herzegovina:- Implementation of the Priority R-econstruction Program, Status- R~p~rt  ·. 
to the Donor Community, November 1997.  ·  ·  ·  · 
3 December 1995 .  and June -1996,. respectively.  ·An agreement with the London 
Club creditors  was  reached  in July  1997. on the  restrUcturing  of over  US$1 
billion debt.  Negotiations With Paris club creditors are exp_ected to be  conclud~d 
soon aftet the  authorities  reach .  agreement  on  an  IMF  :-supported  programme. 
Clearance  of arrears  to  the  EIB,  which  amounted  to  approximately  ECU 6 
million (including penalties) at end-1997; will also have to be  dealt within the 
framework. of  th~ IMF::.supported programme as a precondition for an effective 
involvement of  the EIB ·in BiH..  ·  - -· 
_Prospect for the early conclusion of an IMP-supported programme have recently 
improved, pending the adoption of  satisfactory and mutually-consistent State and 
Entity budgets for  1998, '-including  the establishment of automatic  mechanisms 
for external debt service payments. In particular, a number of  essential legislation 
. establishing common foreign trade and debt policies was adopted in June 199T 
-The new Central Bank of BiH· launched its op(!rations in August 1997. and the 
. design·ofthe new common currency (the convertible marka}~as imposed on all. 
· parties in January  1998.  Despite these achievements, much more  needs.  to  be 
done to effectively implement' open and qJ.arket-oriented economic policies anp 
ensuring- good governance, transparency, and accountability iri  the_ use of donor 
~d.  .  .  ' 
·3.  Prospects _for Bank operations 
3.1 . As  a  rule~  the  EIB  interv'enes  outside  the  Commimity  in  the  framework  of 
protocols, co-operation or association agreements signed between the Community 
and a  particuiar c9untry.  In the absence of a Financial Protocol or Agreement 
between BiH arid the Commtinity;  the involvement of  the EIB in B_iH  should be 
consistent with the policy of  the Union in this country. -
3.2 ·The Bank's involvement in  BH-1  would require a Council Decision, on the basis 
of a Commission proposal, under Article 235  with consultation of the European · 
Parliament,  indicating  the  Community  guarantee  arrangements- as  well  as  the 
amount for the new commitment. The Council Decision would. indicate that the 
new  lending .  mandate _  is  in  addition  to  that  defined  in  Council  Decision • 
97/256/EC of 14 April1997. 
The EIB operation in BiH would be of exceptional nature.  An amount of about 
· ECU 100 million could be envisaged on EIB  lending on own resources.  This 
amount could be reconsidered on the basis of the experience. · Towards this end; 
.  the Commission and the EIB will present  ~to Council a. report with th'e evaluation 
of the situation no  later than one year after the entry into force  of .the  eventual 
Council Decision.  ·  .  -
3.3  The  concl~sion :and  implementation  of  a  Stand-By  IMF  prog~amine  and 
subsequent arrangements will be crucial for ensuring BiH's capacity .to repay the  . 
EIB, ip.cluding through the mobilization oflarge scale e:xtemal assistance,/with.a . 
high degree' of. concessionality.  ·  ~ 
·.  4 
)  . 
.  . 3.4  In view ofthe low income and BiH'~ eligibility to IDA, EIB loans would need to 
be combined with a substantial grant element from the Cominunity Budget for the 
Bank to intervene effectively.  This could take the form of interest subsidy and/ 
or cofinancing on a  case-by-case  basis.  . Moreover,  the  Bank could  consid~r 
granting longer then the usual grace period._ 
- . 
3.5  Further to  a  decision  on  a  specific  mandate  and  the  appropriate  guarantee 
arrangements,  the  Bank's intervention in BiH is  also  subject to  the  previous 
clearance of  all arrea_rs (see section 2.3). 
3.6  The Bank would operate, within the framework of  the Reconstruction progranime 
agreed at the various Donors' conferences, in sectors where its contribution and 
expertise can play a meaningful role and with its intervention aim to the -regional 
integration  of the  area.  · The  sectors  that' could  benefit from  possible  Bank 
-financing  are  general  infrastructure  including . transport  (in  particular  the 
reconstruction of roads and bridges), energy, telecommunications, environment 
(with focus on the water, waste water and sanitation projects).  At a later state, 
when structural  reforms. are  impl~mented, the  industrial  sector  could  also  be 
considered. 
·.  . 
3.7  Projects to be supported by the Bank would have to meet the Bank's lending 
criteria notably those concerning economic, technical and financial viability and 
·be in line with _t}(e  relevant Community legislation.  The Bank's usual  lending 
conditions will apply.  ·  .  . 
3.8  As for other lending mandates, the possible EIB loans in BiH would be subject-to 
- the arrangements set out in the Guarantee Fund Regulation. 
4.  Conclusion 
· In the light of  the above, should the Council be favoirrable to the EIB carrying out 
its operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Commission would prepare a proposal 
for  a  decision  granting  the  Community  Budget  guarantee  to  the  EIB  for  itS 
'operations in ·this country.  · 
'-. 
·' 
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